ME...
This paper deals with Gustave von Grunebaum's approach to literary criticism. The topic accounts for his reputation within the scientific community of Near Eastern studies. Although the above mentioned articles by Laroui, Turner, and Waines are part of the discussion on Grunebaum the Orientalist which concentrates on Grunebaum's way of representing modern Muslim societies to his Western audience, Edward Said's concept of Orientalism will not be my frame of reference, because I am interested in Grunebaum's understanding of medieval Arabic literature.

Since Grunebaum was a prolific author, I have to focus on a small selection of his writings. This selection includes: his Habilitationsschrift — titled Die Wirklichkeitsweite der früh-arabischen Dichtung — and the article "Begriff und Aufgaben der arabischen Literaturwissenschaft", both published in 1937; his famous and widely read Medieval Islam, first published in 1946; Kritik und Dichtkunst, a collection of articles about Arabic literary history, translated into German and published in 1955; and the small volume on French African literature, published in 1964.

I shall argue that Grunebaum's contribution to the understanding of medieval Arabic literature is the contribution of an historian rather than that of a literary critic. My argument is based on the following three observations:

(1) his philological assumption that true facts are transported within texts,
(2) his assumption of an anthropological constant, of a homo dicens, and
(3) his understanding of the terms humanist and medieval.

The philological assumption that true facts are transported within texts

As already mentioned, in 1937 Grunebaum published both his Habilitationsschrift, (Wirklichkeitsweite), and the article "Begriff". These two texts complement each other by employing different approaches.

The article gives a survey of the state of the arts in the field of Arabic literature. It contains lengthy notes in which Grunebaum proves that he has diligently read his way through the Western Orientalist library. He knows his predecessors and his contemporaries, and he concludes bluntly that the field of Arabic studies is underdeveloped when compared with the state of the arts in Western languages: "Der Fortschritt der arabischen Literaturwissenschaft hängt im Augenblick davon ab, daß sie ihre partielle Rückständigkeit erkennt und aus dieser Einsicht die Konsequenzen zieht" (Begriff, 151. See also ibid., 147).

The Habilitationsschrift has the subtitle Eine literaturwissenschaftliche Untersuchung. It represents an example of the kind of literary criticism within the field of Arabic studies whose very absence Grunebaum deplores in his survey. The Habilitationsschrift contains a wealth of references to the Arabic sources in question and lacks any reference to any literary theory or methodology. Moreover, the introduction displays two remarkable details. First, Grunebaum skips two important topos: one topos answers the question of why the author chose that topic. Grunebaum is indebted to his predecessors, but he does not specify to whom or for what: "Daß... die Lei-
stungen der Vorgänger ausgewertet worden, ist dankbar verzeichnete Selbstverständlichkeit“ (Wirklichkeitsweite: III). The other topos answers the question of why the author chose the texts in question. Grunebaum confesses a certain predilection, appeals to his reader’s sympathy, and remains silent: “daß bei der Auswahl zumindest persönliche Vorliebe maßgeblich mitbestimmt, mag entschuldbar heißen” (ibid. III).

Second, Grunebaum addresses in his thesis not only Arabists but also scholars of comparative literature and aesthetics: “Bemühung und Anspruch, gewissermaßen ein Porträt der früharabischen Dichtung zu entwerfen, wenden sich über die eigentliche Orientalistik hinaus an vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft und Ästhetik” (ibid. III). However, he does not provide any introductory manual or information for non-Arabists. Afterwards, Grunebaum starts his thesis with a high-strung polemic against theory and philosophy: “Der Versuch, nach allgemein literaturwissenschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten zu einer zusammenfassenden Charakteristik der früharabischen Dichtung durchzudringen, darf nicht dahin mißdeutet werden, als sollten bestimmte Theoreme oder überhaupt philosophisch deduzierte Grundsätze an dem mehr oder weniger zufälligen Stoff dieses Schrifttums auf ihre Stichhaltigkeit untersucht werden” (ibid. 1).

Grunebaum claims to use universal criteria of literary criticism in order to determine the comprehensive characteristics of pre-Islamic Arabic poetry, whereas he rejects the use of certain theorems and philosophically deduced principles in order to prove their correctness by applying them to the corpus of pre-Islamic poetry which is more or less just a randomly chosen corpus of texts. Therefore, theorems and philosophically deduced principles are the very opposite of universal criteria. These universal criteria can be identified within each literary text because they are universal so that each reader can find them and each text must contain them. That each text must contain them and each reader can find them is, on the other hand, also taken as a guarantee for their universal truth. Grunebaum is not applying something alien to a text’s outside. He is extracting some universal and true essence from its inside due to his “Bestreben, dem künstlerischen Wesen des philologisch verstandenen Werkes beizukommen und dabei, soweit eben Einfühlung und exakte Deutung reichen, Struktur und Grenzen der poetischen Gattung aus den Zeugnissen selbst, also gleichsam von innen her, abzuleiten” (ibid. 1). 6 Grunebaum hereby has found his way to the philologist’s last resort, the positivistic axiom that a text provides its reader with the instruction of how to read it’.

6 This is, of course, a platonistic approach to the philosophical problems of knowledge and perception, though I do not know a text by Grunebaum in which he explicitly refers to Platonism or Neoplatonism in order to describe his own individual convictions as a scholar.

7 A critical analysis of this positivistic axiom can be found, for instance, in Lucien Febvre’s inaugural lecture held in 1933 at the Collège de France: “Aber jede Geschichte ist Wahl... Sie ist es vor allem deswegen, weil der Historiker seine Stoffe erschafft oder, wenn man so will, neuerzählt: der Historiker, der nicht auf gut Glück wie ein Lumpensammler die Vergangenheit durchstreift, sondern mit einer präzisen
lack of reference to any literary theory or methodology is telling. Grunebaum pays his respect to his scientific community which is still defining the business of Oriental studies as philology, as reading texts in order to dig out their true facts. Grunebaum is defensive, but not too defensive. There is no remark at all about the textual transmission of the poems in question, the very touchstone of philology. He neither reflects on historiography and other non-fictional texts nor questions the use of fictional texts as historical sources. He too is still digging for true facts, even if he is mainly interested in universal facts of the Arab’s mind-set as “the description of mental structures, or in other ways, psychological truth” (Modern Islam: 40).

The assumption of an anthropological constant, of a *homo dicens*

Grunebaum can dig true facts of the Arab’s mind-set out of texts because the human being is a *homo dicens*. This means that Grunebaum sets the *homo dicens* as an anthropological constant: “Man stands revealed through any and all of his words and works. Depending on the medium in which his mind manifests itself, its bent is bared with greater or less immediacy. Despite their appeal to our emotions, confessions made through the filter of music or stone remain ambiguous, their verbal, even their psychological interpretation, conjecture. Muslim civilization’s greatest contribution to man’s spiritual life were [sic] offered on the verbal level. ... literature bespeaks the concept Islamic civilization formed of man” (Medieval Islam: 258). Literature provides the historian with historical documents for the mind-set of the time of its production so that the human essence of a civilization can be detected in its literature.

Absicht, einem Problem, das es zu lösen, einer Hypothese, die es zu überprüfen gilt. ... Das Wesentliche seiner Arbeit besteht doch darin, die Objekte seiner Beobachtung sozusagen zu erzeugen, ... und erst dann ... zu „lesen“. Eine äußerst verwickelte Aufgabe; beschreiben, was man sieht, geht ja noch an; sehen, was man beschreiben muß, da liegt die Schwierigkeit.“ (Febvre 1990: 13). It is ironic, indeed, that Grunebaum himself proves his own diagnosis of the time lag between Near Eastern studies and other studies in the field of humanities, while even his critics (e.g. Larou 1973: 15 and Turner 1984: 194) respect his interest in improving the methodological foundations of Near Eastern studies.

8 “Stammesgeschichte und Kampfbeschreibung, nie ganz frei von mahnder Berührung vorgetragen, werden weder phantastisch verziert noch paradigmatisch verdichtet, die zweckhaft-enge Stilisierungen ändern nichts daran, daß die Dichter Tatbestände... berichten.“ (Wirklichkeitsweise: 208 f.)

9 See also “Die Weite der dichterischen Wirklichkeit einer bestimmten Epoche wird dem Verständnis am ehesten zugänglich werden, wenn zeitlos notwendige Beziehungen des schöpferischen Menschen als die gemeinsame Grundlage der Motivbearbeitung aller Themenkreise in ihrer einmaligen historischen Ausprägung analytisch erkannt und geschildert werden” (Wirklichkeitsweise: 3). Cf. “More conscious of their language than any people in the world, seeing it not only as the greatest of their arts but also as their common good, most Arabs, if asked to define what they meant by ‘the Arab nation’, would begin by saying that it included all those who spoke the Arabic language” (Hourani 1962: 1). Therefore, one has to ask of how Grunebaum’s assumption of a *homo dicens* mirrors a certain self-understanding of Arabs, though I cannot answer this question within this paper.
and described in articles like “The spirit of Islam as shown in its literature” or “Literature in the context of Islamic civilization.”

This anthropological constant has two important implications.

First, Grunebaum’s assumption of a *homo dicens* is not only an assumption of an anthropological constant, but it is also an idealistic assumption. He still believes and claims that human reason should be “a universal regulatory force... that human intelligence, carrying its binding norms in itself, would arrive at unified and total truth” (*French African*: 9 f), even if he feels “the burden of a rational universe” (*ibid.* 11).

Second, the anthropological constant of a *homo dicens* converts literary terms and aesthetic judgements into ahistorical psychological categories of the human being’s intellectual development\(^\text{10}\). Literary criticism thus gains a scientific objectivity and respectability by being interpreted as a kind of applied psychology. Although Grunebaum embraces psychology as an objective anthropological explanation for human creativeness and intellectual productivity, Grunebaum’s psychology is the very opposite of psychoanalysis whose founding father Freud “by projecting human motivation into the subconscious contributes to the deprecation of intellect and consciousness as sources of error and self-deception” (*French African*: 10). Born in Vienna, Grunebaum spent almost the first half of his life in the Austrian capital living in the same city as for instance, Sigmund Freud, Karl Kraus, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Robert Musil, Elias Canetti, and Arnold Schönberg. There is no possible answer for the question of how Grunebaum himself would have explained his own intellectual education during those heady times in Western Europe, encountering both the spread of Fascism and the high noon of the classic modern arts.

Grunebaum’s assumption of a *homo dicens* reflects his lifelong interest in human beings’ self-expression, self-experience, self-realization, self-statement, self-consciousness, and self-view which forms the central thread in his writings. Grunebaum, however, does not direct within his studies on the self-experience of others the same scrutinizing gaze on his own writings, though they also can be read as an expression of his own self-experience. He remains absolutely silent on behalf of his own person\(^\text{11}\). He describes the same kind of silence as “an aspect of Islam’s outlook on man” (*Literature*: 11) and explains it with “the deep-seated inhibition that protects... the person *per se* from his own as from others’ indelicacy” (*ibid.* 12). Grunebaum knows analyzing the texts of others that there is “the stage in which the author is, in the last

\(^{10}\) Cf. the dictum that Orientalism argues “from the specifically human detail to the general transhuman one” (Said 1979: 96).

\(^{11}\) This statement refers, of course, only to the public person Gustave von Grunebaum. I do not know a text in which he explicitly reflects on the possibility to analyze his own writings the way he analyzes the writings of others. Cf. “Was man sieht - aus der zu jeder Optik nötigen Distanz -, ist immer schon die Negation des Eigenen. Keiner fügt gern für sich hinzu: Wie sollte es anders sein?” (Blumenberg 1987: 114).
analysis, speaking only of himself (if under assumed names)” (French African: 35), while he himself is writing about others. Having witnessed the reminiscences of the last holds on the multicultural stage of the Austrian empire before 1918, Grunebaum develops a very strong sense for the psychological side-effect of the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy with the end of World War I. For this breakdown forced the survivors to construct a new self-understanding out of the unwieldy piles gathered on the ruins of the shattered grandeur. Grunebaum does not use this knowledge as an historian of Austria. He uses it for an anthropological interpretation of the more or less traumatic turning points in Muslim history, as for instance the grapple of contemporary Muslim societies with Western modernity represented as colonialism and democracy. At the same time, he never stops to work on his own experiences: “that perpetual tension through which we grope farther and farther onward unto the unknown” (ibid. 41). The consequence is the ambivalent understanding of his own work as simul imperfectus et perfectus: “Es liegt im Wesen der Wissenschaft begründet, daß alle Forscherarbeit sich in einem als vorläufiger Versuch und als gültige Prägung darstellt” (Wirklichkeitsweise: III). Grunebaum’s solution was to analyze comparable experiences made by others. As such he never talked about himself, but instead talked about nothing beyond his own experiences.

The understanding of the terms humanist and medieval

Nevertheless, for Grunebaum, it is psychology that is the frame of reference just for the individual, the singular human being. The frame of reference for the social human being is provided by history, and this history has to be world history because all human beings are equal by birth, and world history has to be an infinite process because “we do not consider our present stage as final” (French African: 40). In addition, world history is a process divided into pre-modern history and modern history by the European Renaissance, and more specifically and also in accordance with

\[12\] See for instance “It should be noted that in general, the Arabs did not reflect on human creativeness as a problem, be it anthropological or psychological. Intellectual productivity would be a subject of admiration but not of inquiry. Nowhere is it designated as the common characteristic of thinker, poet, and artist; and nowhere are the creative minds singled out from the merely receptive in virtue of their very creativeness. In contrast cf. the attitude of the Greeks as expressed by (Pseudo-) Aristotle, Problems, trans. W.S. Hett, XXX, 1 (953 a): “Why is it that all men who are outstanding in philosophy, poetry or the arts are melancholic...?” (Aesthetic foundation: 325, n.5). Grunebaum argues that the Arabs did not reflect on creativity while the Greeks did so, for the Arabs did not distinguish between creative and receptive while the Greek knew that outstanding men were melancholy. Besides the problem that for the Greeks melancholy as one of the four temperaments was also related to black bile, Grunebaum’s quote does not demonstrate that for the Greeks a melancholy outstanding man was creative, not just receptive.
GUSTAVE VON GRUNEBAUM'S APPROACH TO LITERARY CRITICISM

Grunebaum's idealistic approach, by Humanism, so that pre-modern is medieval, while humanist is modern.

Grunebaum, however, was not the first to use Humanism as the landmark of European intellectual history and as the litmus test for modernity. In 1921, the German Orientalist Carl Heinrich Becker (1876-1933) published the article Der Islam im Rahmen einer allgemeinen Kulturgeschichte. Becker compared Islam with Christianity by contrasting their adaptations of the classical heritage and the outlines of their development. Becker concludes that the actual difference between Orientals and Occidentals is due to Humanism. Grunebaum thus defines Humanism as "the Greek tradition, the scientific impulse, the historical sentiment, the cultivation of reason over against authority". This means that "Man is to be... educated to develop his self in developing this world as the deed most deserving of everlasting reward" (Medieval Islam: 230).

This usage of the term humanist has two implications concerning the model of world history from which it is derived.

First, this model of world history is hierarchical. Grunebaum puts it this way: "we term all civilizations before his [i.e. Descartes'] time, Eastern or Western, 'medieval'... those civilizations possess, in varying degrees, these characteristics".

If one would try to project this hierarchy onto a two-dimensional map of world hist-

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13 Grunebaum, Cultural function: 5. See also Grunebaum, Parallelism: 91-111.

In this article, Grunebaum describes the "unconscious rapprochement of mood and thought in Islam and Greek Christendom" (105), but he concludes nevertheless that the "assertion of human independence, of man's choice of spiritual affiliation is one of the features of that 'Latin' humanism which was to separate Islam and the West for good and for all" (111). I would like to thank Jacques Waardenburg for reminding me of Grunebaum's comparative studies on Arab, Byzantine, and Latin Middle Ages.


15 Aesthetic foundation: 339. See also "The cleavage between Byzantium and the Arabs... is due essentially to the different principles of selection applied to the classical heritage" (Parallelism: 92). Cf. "Gewiß wurde dann auch vom Islam der Aristotelismus neubelebt, aber weder einer der großen Dramatiker, noch gar Homer... Man brach nirgends mit der antiken Überlieferung und konnte deshalb das vergessene und verschüttete Hellas auch nicht wiederentdecken" (Becker 1967: I, 35).

ory by translating the degree of intellectual progress into spatiality, each civilization would occupy a certain space within the boundaries of the one map called world history so that each civilization must occupy a different space according to its different intellectual development. Different civilizations can be similar, but they will never be equal.

Second, within this model of world history time is secondary to mind-set, for hierarchy is determined by the degree of intellectual progress that characterizes the mind-set of an era and that can be dug out of its textual remnants. Grunebaum defines ‘classicism’ as “the acceptance of a moral obligation to reproduce a model of past perfection”\(^{17}\) so that he can compare different kinds of ‘classical’ mind-sets such as the Greek, the Arab, the Muslim, or the German\(^{18}\). On the one hand, this produces absolutely ahistorical relationships, as for instance, between ‘classical’ Arabic poetry and ‘classical’ Islam because for Grunebaum ‘classical’ Arabic poetry is pre-Islamic poetry and ‘classical’ Islam characterizes the umma during the ninth and the tenth centuries. On the other hand, the pure simultaneity of Arabic and European medieval texts is no ground for a comparison. The Christian Middle Ages are just a transition from antiquity to Humanism, while late antiquity and the Christian Middle Ages are only Dark Ages in comparison with the classical antiquity. Therefore, Grunebaum cannot compare medieval ‘classical’ Arabic literature with European medieval ‘non-classical’ literature. The argument for a comparison is an essential ‘classicality’ which produces the similarity of different ‘classical’ mind-sets. Grunebaum can apply Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s ‘classical’ definition of poems as texts “expressing and recapturing personal, private sentiment”\(^{19}\) to ‘classical’ Arabic poems, even

\(^{17}\) Literature: 10. See also Concept. Although I cannot answer the question within this paper, one has to ask if it would be possible to find a way out of the dead ends of classicism and taqlid by using Eric Hobbsbawn’s concept of inventing traditions because the “term ‘invented tradition’... includes both ‘traditions’ actually invented, constructed and formally instituted and those emerging in a less traceable manner within a brief and dateable period... and establishing themselves with great rapidity.” (Hobsbawn 1983: 1).

\(^{18}\) Cf. Laroui’s observation that “the adjectives that von Grunebaum unites with the word Islam (mediaeval, classical, modern) are neutral or even super-redundant: there is no difference between classical Islam and medieval Islam, or just Islam. ... there is only one Islam which changes within itself when tradition takes form on the basis of a period which is reconstructed and presumed to be classical” (Laroui 1973: 27). Laroui’s criticism misses the point that Grunebaum defines “the classical (as against the post-classical, Hellenistic, i.e. Orientalised, or Gnosticised) heritage of antiquity” (Grunebaum, Islam and Hellenism: 22). Therefore, Grunebaum describes for instance “he concept of the Mystic Saint who first continues the classical Divine Man but gradually develops into the Perfect Man of «post-classical» antiquity” (ibid. 21), and he concludes that “by A. D. 1100 the period of «enlightenment» had come to a close” (ibid. 21).

if as a result he must complain that "Human conflict is strangely absent from Muslim and especially Arab-Muslim literature."\(^{20}\)

**Conclusion**

The British scholar and author C. S. Lewis warns the reader of medieval poetry that "what we find inside will always depend a great deal on what we have brought in with us."\(^{21}\) Hence, C. S. Lewis does not accept the often heard statement of disappointment that "one cannot find what is not there" (*ibid.* 4), and calls this patronizing attitude unduly optimistic, for "Here, as elsewhere, untrained eyes or a bad instrument produce both errors; they create phantasmal objects as well as miss real ones" (*ibid.* 4).\(^{22}\)

Keeping C. S. Lewis' warning in mind, it seems to me that Gustave von Grunebaum's most important contribution to the understanding of medieval Arabic literature is the establishment of literary criticism within the field of Near Eastern studies. He accomplished this in two ways. First, Grunebaum the scholar never stopped to work on Arabic and Persian *belles lettres*, thus lending prestige to literary studies as such in accordance with his career. Second, Grunebaum the administrator developed the institutional infrastructure for Near Eastern studies by organizing not only institutions like the research center at the University of California, Los Angeles, but also conferences like the Della Vida Conference. This is especially important because research depends on both well equipped libraries and personal exchange. Consequently, it seems to me that I too would create a phantasmal object, as C. S. Lewis might have called it, if I were to reject Grunebaum's writings for not supplying me with the answers I wanted to hear. His approach to medieval Arabic literature is not my approach, but his writings are an important part of the Western Orientalist tradition.

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\(^{20}\) *Literature: 11. See also “Aber verdient eine Lyrik, der das persönlich verbindliche Stimmungselement ebenso abgeht wie jegliche Bekenntnishaftigkeit, noch diesen Namen?” (Wirklichkeitsweite: 202 f.).

\(^{21}\) Lewis 1966: 1. According to Hans Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics an aesthetic experience requires at first the assumption of the aesthetic foreignness of a text and second the readiness to get involved in it.

\(^{22}\) Cf. "Ich frage nun nach der Entstehung des Philologen und behaupte:
1) der junge Mensch kann noch gar nicht wissen, wer Griechen und Römer sind,
2) er weiss nicht, ob er zu ihrer Erforschung sich eignet" (Nietzsche: 96).
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B. Secondary sources


