A HANBALĪ CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM

Merlin Swartz

Boston University

Our understanding of Ḥanbalīsm has undergone something of a revolution over the past half century thanks in part to the discovery and publication of new sources (bearing on the history of the school) and, in part, to advances in scholarship (represented in the work of H. Laoust, G. Makdisi and others). In contrast to the older view of Ḥanbalīsm, reflected in 19th century scholarship and based to a large extent on non-Ḥanbalī and frequently anti-Ḥanbalī sources, the school that has emerged, especially in the scholarship of the last several decades, is one characterized by significant diversity and, moreover, a school that continued to evolve throughout the medieval period. It is now clear that one of the hallmarks of medieval Ḥanbalīsm was precisely its diversity — including differences over a range of questions both juridical and theological.

In the remainder of this paper, I would like to focus on a hitherto unpublished work from the 12th century that not only confirms this diversity but suggests that intellectual differences within the school may well have run deeper than anyone has so far suspected. The work in question, Ibn al-Ḡawzī’s Kitāb Abhār as-sifāt1, is a vigorous critique of anthropomorphist tendencies within the Ḥanbalī school, and an equally vigorous defense of ta’wil (metaphorical exegesis)2 as the most effective antidote to these tendencies. Ibn al-Ḡawzī, the author of this work, was himself a Ḥanbalī3.

The only surviving copy of the work, which belongs to the Şehid Ali Pasha Collection in Istanbul (MS. no. 1561), consists of 42 folios including a title page and a

---

1 For the sake of economy, I shall henceforth refer to the work simply as Abhār. I am presently engaged in preparing a critical edition of the Arabic text along with a translation and study of the work — which I hope to publish in the near future. The occasional reference to paragraph numbers in the notes that follow are to my critical edition of the Arabic text.

2 An admittedly loose rendering of the term. Among the terms used most commonly in Abhār to refer to tropical language — i.e., the language for which ta’wil is appropriate — are mağāz and istfārā.

3 He was born around 510 A.H. (A.D. 1116) and died on the 7th of Ramadān 597 (June 11, 1201). A convenient listing of the chief sources on Ibn al-Ḡawzī’s life can be found in Kahhāla, n.d.: V-VI. 157-158. For a brief but valuable account of his life, see the article on him by Laoust 1972; as well as his remarks in Laoust 1959; for a more detailed treatment, see Ibn al-Ḡawzī, Qasās 15-38. Since the publication of these works a number of new studies on various facets of his life and work have appeared, among them Miṣbāḥ 17-39; and the important study by Hartmann 1986: 51-115. For a somewhat more popular treatment, see the short but interesting work by ‘Ali 1988.

THE ARABIST. BUDAPEST STUDIES IN ARABIC 21–22 (1999)
https://doi.org/10.58513/ARABIST.1999.21-22.3
colophon\(^4\). From all appearances, the manuscript is complete, and the internal evidence points clearly to a Ġawzīan authorship\(^5\). Though I cannot get into a discussion of the date of the work’s composition here, the internal evidence suggests that it was written sometime between 570/1174 and 590/1193, i.e., sometime during the last 20 years of Ibn al-Ḡawzī’s public life\(^6\).

It is difficult to classify the work in relation to the standard religious genres of the time. On the one hand, it is an intensely polemical work directed against three fellow Ḥanbalīs: Ibn Ḥāmid\(^7\), Abū Ya‘lā\(^8\) and Ibn Zāğūn\(^7\) — men whom Ibn al-Ḡawzī

\(^4\) Though the name of the copyist is not given, the copy appears to have been made in Damascus, and the copying, according to the colophon, was completed on the 17th of Raṣāb in 890 (July 30, 1485). It is clear from the colophon that the genealogy of the manuscript consisted of several generations of manuscripts and that the oldest copy in this series was made by a certain Nūr ad-Dīn ‘Alī b. Ġamāl ad-Dīn b. ‘Abdallāh as-Sāfī, a student of Fāhil ad-Dīn al-Muhaddīq as-Sāfī, both of Damascus and possibly younger contemporaries of Ibn al-Ḡawzī.

\(^5\) As it turns out, Abhār is a longer version of another of Ibn al-Ḡawzī’s works, his Def\(^5\). For reasons that are not entirely clear, Def\(^5\) has so far not attracted much attention from the scholarly community either in the West or in the Muslim world despite its publication already in 1926.

\(^6\) He retired from public life in 590/1193, not willingly, of course, since in the summer of that year he was arrested and taken to Wāṣiṭ where he remained under house arrest until the month of Sa‘īd 595/June 1199. If Abhār was indeed written during the twenty-year period I have suggested, I am inclined toward a later rather than an earlier date, perhaps sometime in the 580s (i.e., between 1184 and 1193).

\(^7\) Hasan b. Ḥāmid b. ‘Alī Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Warrāq (d. 403/1912), one of the most influential figures within the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdād during the first half of the Būyid period. Among the more important sources on Ibn Ḥāmid and his influence within the Ḥanbalī school, see Abū Ya‘lā, Tabaqāt II, 171-177; al-Ḥaṭīb, Tārīkh Baghdād VII, 303; Ibn al-Imām, Sadaqāt II, 166-67; Ibn Kaṣīr, Bidawī XI, 373; Shāṭi‘ī, Muḥāṣaṣer 26; Ibn Bādrān, Madhbal 206; and Ibn al-Asīr, Kamil IX, 242. For additional sources, see Sezgin 1967-84: I, 515; Laoust 1972; and Makdisi 1963: 227-232.

\(^8\) Muhammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. Muhammad b. al-Farrā‘, known to his contemporaries as Abū Ya‘lā or simply the Qādi‘, was born 380/990 and died in 458/14 August 1066. A man of immense learning and a prolific writer, Abū Ya‘lā was a complex and controversial figure. Ibn al-Ḡawzī was not the first to accuse him of anthropomorphic sympathies. Ibn al-ʿAṭīr reports that Abū Muḥammad at-Ṭanīmī, an important Ḥanbalī of the period, was deeply offended by the views of Abū Ya‘lā on the question of the sifāt (Kāmil X, 52). Judging from references in medieval sources (cf. Kāmil IX, 460), it is quite likely that the work by Abū Ya‘lā which occasioned the anthropomorphic charges brought against him was his Ibn al-Ṭabā‘ at-tā‘wilāt li-ahbār as-sifāt, sometimes referred to simply as Kitāb as-sifāt, and its shorter version Muḥāṣaṣer ibn al-Ṭabā‘ at-tā‘wilāt. Unfortunately, these works have not survived, but we do have fragments of them quoted in other works. Ibn Abū Ya‘lā cites several lengthy passages from the Ibn al-Ṭabā‘ in Tabaqāt II, 211-212) as does Ibn Taymīyya (e.g., *Agīda, 454-455*, and others. It seems likely that the unnamed work which Ibn al-Ḡawzī has in mind in Abhār when he criticizes Abū Ya‘lā is the Ibn al-Ṭabā‘. — In addition to the references cited above, see the notice in Abū Ya‘lā, Tabaqāt II, 193-230 (where Abū Ya‘lā is presented in a sympathetic light); also Ibn al-Ḡawzī’s *Muntazam VIII*, 243-244; as well as his *Manāqib*, 520-521; al-Ḥaṭīb, Tārīkh Baghdād II, 256; Ibn Kaṣīr, Bidawī XII, 101; Ibn al-ʿAṭīr, Kāmil X, 52; Ibn al-Imām, Sadaqāt II, 306-307; Brockelmann 1937-42: I, 502; Suppl. I, 686; Laoust 1972b: 765-766; Makdisi 1963: 232-234 (and index); and, above all, Abū Ya‘lā’s *Muḥāṣaṣar*. For an interesting perspective on Abū Ya‘lā and the intellectual evolution of medieval Ḥanbalīsm, see Gimaq 1977: 157-178.
regards as champions of anthropomorphism and whom he accuses of leading the school away from its original teachings in the direction of an anthropomorphist outlook\(^9\). The views of his opponents are detailed at length in the work and rebutted. It is also clear, however, that in some respects *Aḥbār* is a *kālām*\(^{11}\) style work, in the sense that it accepts most, if not all, of the operative assumptions of the *mutakallimūn*\(^{12}\). At the same time, *Aḥbār* was clearly not meant to be a manual on *kālām* comparable to the *Muṭṭamad* of Abū Ya’lā, for example, or the works of the great Aš’arite and Muʿtazilite theologians of the 10th and 11th centuries, but it does assume *kālām* as its frame of reference, and many of the arguments employed in the work come straight out of medieval works on *kālām*\(^{13}\).

The main body of *Aḥbār* is divided into two major parts:

1) In the first part (consisting of 11 folios) Ibn al-Ḡawzī sets forth a theory of knowledge (an epistemology) and lays out the general lines of his argument against anthropomorphism (*taḥbīth/taḡṣīm*). He argues consistently in this part (as he does throughout the work, in fact) that matters having to do with God’s existence (*wuqūd*), his essence (*dā‘ī*) and his attributes (*ṣifāt*) must rest on peremptory evidence (*adilla qāṭ`īyya*), of which there are two kinds:

(a) the evidence supplied by reason (*aql*) and

(b) the evidence contained in revelation.

Of these two, the evidence of reason enjoys a privileged position: it is the necessary starting-point for the establishment of God’s existence, and it must be one’s principal

---


\(^{10}\) The three Ḥanbalīs singled out as the chief advocates of anthropomorphism within the school were men who in many ways dominated 11th-century Ḥanbalism. They were the authors of numerous works on law and theology, and it was precisely because they had aired their “anthropomorphist” views in their writings that they were partly, if not largely, responsible in Ibn al-Ḡawzī’s view for the widespread perception that Ḥanbalis were *ipsa facto* anthropomorphists.

\(^{11}\) A technical term used in medieval sources to refer to the kind of theology done by the professional theologians (*mutakallimūn*). Following J. van Ess and A. I. Sabra, the term is commonly rendered “dialectical theology” since its literary form presupposed the give-and-take of academic disputation. See especially van Ess 1976: 23–30; and Sabra 1994: 1–42.

\(^{12}\) He accepted their understanding of reason, their cosmology, their view of God and their style of argumentation.

\(^{13}\) These two features of the work (its polemical character and its *kālām* orientation) are blended in such a way as to produce an integrated perspective.
guide in deciphering the meaning of scripture. Since the authority of revelation rests on the prior establishment of God’s existence — through the proofs provided by reason — it is only at a secondary stage that revelation comes into play. However, even then the use of revelation in establishing the divine attributes is a complicated and delicate matter, and ultimately depends on a correct “reading” of the text — or, as we would say, on an adequate hermeneutic.

While the traditions of the Prophet (the hadīth) fall into the general category of revelation (along with the Quran), they have to be used with greater care because one cannot assume a priori that all hadīths are authentic. A critical analysis of the hadīth is therefore inescapable. Ibn al-Ḡawzī’s general operating principle is that only those traditions that rest on multiple authorities (i.e., those that are mutawātīn) can be used to establish a divine attribute.

The other major issue taken up in part I is the question of taqlid — which I shall return to later in the paper.

2) The second part of Abhār, which consists of 31 folios and represents the main body of the work, is devoted to an exegetical examination of a series of texts from the Quran and the hadīth which, according to Ibn al-Ḡawzī, had been used by his fellow Hanbalis in defending their anthropomorphist views. It is in this part of the work that he details the charges against his Hanbalī colleagues. The two terms that he uses to characterize their views are tasbīb and tağṣīm. Although Ibn al-Ḡawzī does sometimes differentiate between the two terms, he frequently uses them interchangeably. As used in Abhār, they mean taking finite bodies and, in particular, the human form (ṣūra), as the basis for conceiving the divine attributes — in short, conceiving the attributes in corporeal terms. In an effort to spell out the specifics of the charge against the three Hanbalis, Ibn al-Ḡawzī quotes frequently, and sometimes at length, from their writings. In the passages which he cites, his opponents are portrayed as ascribing to God a human-like form (ṣūra) consisting of numerous members: a face, eyes, a mouth, hands, thighs, feet, a front, a back, etc., etc. Moreover, they claim that each of these members constitutes an attribute (ṣīfā) corresponding to something specific and real in the being of God. Consistent with this line of

---

14 In general, it can be said, Ibn al-Ḡawzī’s analysis of the hadīth focused, primarily on the imād, but he does not hesitate to scrutinize the matn when he believes it warranted. On the details of his approach to problematic hadīth, see especially his Mawḍū‘āt 1, 29-104; and Ilal.
15 Traditions that rest on a single authority (i.e., those labeled aḥād) are systematically set aside.
16 Or, more precisely, he tends to assimilate taṣbīb to tağiṣīm.
17 Unfortunately, he does not generally give the titles of the works of Hanbalīs from which he quotes. He does mention the Mutannad of Abū Ya‘lā, but this is an exception. We are thus left to speculate as to which of their writings Ibn al-Ḡawzī has in mind.
18 Both of which are “right” (ṣamīn).
reasoning, they maintain that God can both touch and be touched; that he occupies particular places (amākin) at particular points in time, that his existence in space (ta-
hayyuz) is defined by a particular orientation (giha), and finally, that God's move-
ments are spatially defined, i.e., they entail movement (tabarraka) from one place to ano-
other. Throughout Abhār, Ibn al-Ǧawzī argues that the anthropomorphism of his op-
ponents is problematic for a number of reasons which he details at some length.
But the two criticisms he reiterates most often against anthropomorphism is that
1) it relies on a literalistic method (zāhir) of interpreting scripture (i.e., its rests on
a flawed hermeneutic), and
2) it shows excessive and uncritical deference to the views of earlier authorities
(i.e., it rests on an appeal to tradition (i.e., tradition with a small "t") — viz., the
problem of taqlid.

Let me expand briefly on these two criticisms and note the solutions proposed by
Ibn al-Ǧawzī:

1. Literalism (tafsīr ʿalā ḥ-zāhir)

Anthropomorphic conceptions of God arise, in the first instance, because it is
naively assumed that scripture is to be taken in its literal sense, i.e., that the surface
meaning of the text is the real meaning. Hence, when the Quran refers to God's
"hands" it must mean that God has hands. Likewise with the many other Quranic
attributions of bodily features to God. Why is it that a literalist method of interpreta-
tion seems to lead inevitably to the attribution of material, corporeal features to
God? Ibn al-Ǧawzī's answer is straightforward: the reason it does is that it is based
on a materialist epistemology, i.e., it takes sense experience as its point of departure.
In one passage, Ibn al-Ǧawzī goes so far as to suggest that the epistemology of his
opponents is not fundamentally different from that of the Dābriyya (materialists).
Sense experience is inadequate as a basis for conceiving the divine attributes because
it is limited to the perception of bodies located in time and space, i.e., to finite
bodies.

Since reason (and revelation, rightly understood) demonstrates conclusively that
God is beyond time and space, literalism as an exegetical method must be abandoned.
On the basis of the arguments from contingency and design, Ibn al-Ǧawzī attempts
to show that reason is the only human faculty that has the capacity to rise above
the world of finite bodies to a God who is the necessary cause of all that exists. To
the extent that revelation is concerned with a knowledge of God, it follows, there-

---

19 They may draw different conclusions, but their starting point is the same.

20 Together with the imagination, perhaps, since Ibn al-Ǧawzī does refer occasionally to it, though
it is not clear that it is a distinct faculty separate from reason. More work needs to be done on this ques-
tion.
fore, that reason must be one’s principal guide in deciphering the meaning of revelation. Ibn al-Ǧawzī is able to show, at least to his own satisfaction, that if reason is applied to Scripture properly, it necessarily leads to a “metaphorical” interpretation of those texts that appear to ascribe corporeality to God. In Ḥabīr, Ibn al-Ǧawzī applies ta’wil more or less across the board. Thus references to God’s “face” (waṣāb) are to be taken as referring to his essence (his dāt); his “hand” (yad) as referring to his power (qudra); his, “eyes” (ṣayyān) to his “knowledge” (ʿilm), his “side” (ṣanb) to his authority/command (ʿamr), etc. The only scriptural texts pertaining to the divine attributes that may be taken “as they stand”, without recourse to ta’wil, are those that affirm the transcendence and oneness of God in clear, unequivocal terms – verses like sūra 42:11 (laya ka-miṣli bi ṣayyūn).

2. Excessive Reliance on “Tradition” (taqlīd)

In the second place, Ibn al-Ǧawzī attributes the anthropomorphism of his opponents to taqlīd, that is, to an uncritical reliance on the views of the salaf. Although Ibn al-Ǧawzī appears to allow for the use of a limited kind of taqlīd, when it comes to matters such as the divine attributes, indeed, to all matters having to do with God, taqlīd is to be rejected out of hand. “Taqlīd, he says, is not allowable in matters having to do with the knowledge of God (maʿrifat Allāh).” In support of this position, he cites Ibn ʿAqīl who maintained that in matters of faith “the only thing to be followed is the evidence (dalīl)” since the knowledge of God must rest on peremptory evidence (adilla qat’iyya) — by which he means the evidence provided by reason and revelation — it follows that the views of earlier authorities, while not irrelevant, are of limited importance. He makes this point in an interesting way in connection with an incident involving Ahmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855). When Ahmad was once criticized for taking a position different from that of Ibn Mubārak

---

21 Reason is critical to Ibn al-Ǧawzī for it is precisely reason that makes possible the break between sense experience and the exegetical process.

22 In suggesting these equivalences, Ibn al-Ǧawzī is not saying anything new, of course. He is following a path charted by Muʿtazilite theologians as well as by some of the later Ashʿarite theologians like al-Ǧuyaynī, ʿAbdalqāhīr al-Ǧaṣṣāṣī and Ibn Fūrah.


24 Particularly in the area of applied jurisprudence.

25 The Arabic makes the point even clearer: là yaṭēṣr wa-taqlīdu fī maʿrifat Allāh wa-d-dalīl ʿalī mà qulnā al-Qurʿān wa-n-nayl wa-l-maṣā (fol. Sb).

26 The 11th century Hanbalī theologian who in many ways was Ibn al-Ǧawzī’s principal mentor in matters theological.

27 Presumably by “evidence”, Ibn ʿAqīl means the teaching of Scripture (naql) and the conclusions derived from reason (aql).
(d. 119/737), he replied: "The views of Ibn Mubarak did not come down from heaven". But if taqlid is problematic because it weakens the influence of both reason and revelation, it is flawed also because it introduces an element of subjectivity into the quest for truth. Here Ibn al-ʿGawzī points to an unassailable fact: frequently the salaf differed among themselves and sometimes individual salaf changed their views on important questions. Thus, if one is to take the teaching of the salaf as one's guide, one must not only decide which of the salaf to follow, but which of the views of individual salaf are to be taken as correct. In short, then, if taqlid is to be practiced at all, it requires some kind of prior judgment.

Ibn al-ʿGawzī's principal objection to taqlid, however, is that it weakens the faculty of reason and, in the end, confuses the issue: it makes human beings the criterion of truth.

In concluding his discussion of taqlid Ibn al-ʿGawzī argues that there is no escape from having recourse to ijtihad, that is, to independent judgment based on a personal weighing of the evidence in the light of reason. He observes that this was the modus operandi of the prophets and, in one passage, even suggests that prophets are superior to others primarily because they used ijtihad more rigorously and more consistently.28

Although the zahir method of exegesis and taqlid are different29, their use leads to similar results: zahir (by taking sense experience as its point of reference) and taqlid (by following the lead of tradition)30 work together to diminish the role of reason (taqlid). The Ibn al-ʿGawzī of Abū Bār is a rationalist to a very surprising degree — certainly more so than we are accustomed to expecting from a Hanbalī. While his Hanbalism was questioned by some within the school31, he certainly regarded himself as a Hanbalī and, I believe, with some justification. He was a firm believer in the essential correctness of Ahmad's views (e.g., his Manaqib, especially chapters 20–22) — thoroughly convinced that Ahmad had avoided the anthropomorphist trap32. Ibn

---

28 Fol. 6a (critical edition, par. 21) — Ibn al-ʿGawzī would have found absurd any suggestion that the "gates of ijtihad" had been closed.

29 They entail two quite different operations and serve different purposes.

30 Which ultimately means allowing other human beings (respected to be sure) to decide the issue.

31 Abū l-Ḥaḍīr al-ʿAlī (d. 634/1236) is perhaps the most notable example but there were certainly others. al-ʿAlī's challenge stands out, in part, because Ibn Raḥmān documents it at some length (see his Dāryl, II. 205ff.).

32 Consider, e.g., the following statement: "Nothing has been attributed to Ahmad in the sources that even remotely smacks of anthropomorphism (taʾbīḥ), for his position was that the traditions of the Prophet should be allowed to stand just as they are (without comment) (wa-lam yungal 'an al-imām Ahmad say'un min at-taʾbīḥ wa-lā yuqāribhu wa-imāmā kāna ya'muru bi-imwār l-ahādīt kāna ḥāʾat[ Abhār, fol. 6a]. The problem, for Ibn al-ʿGawzī, was that Hanbalism had been diverted from its founding principles by those who came later and who had strayed from the original teachings of the school. Ibn al-ʿGawzī
al-Ġawzī accepted the authority of the Sunna, vigorously defended the doctrine of the uncreated Quran, and, finally, in matters of jurisprudence (fiqh) affirmed the principles laid down by the school’s early formative thinkers. Whatever else one may say about Aḥbār, it provides substantive evidence that Ibn al-Ġawzī, far from being a die-hard traditionalist, was a vigorous proponent of the principles of ta’wīl and iḥtīḥād. Furthermore, the views advocated in Aḥbār are not those of an isolated, member of the Ḥanbalī school. Contemporary sources make it clear that Ibn al-Ġawzī commanded a significant following within the school, particularly during the last several decades of his public life — i.e., up until 590/1193. Through his efforts as an author, teacher and preacher, he provided a significant voice for the more “progressive” elements within the school. But it is also clear that the views expressed in Aḥbār made him a controversial figure among the more conservative elements of the school and it is not surprising that several Ḥanbalīs played a crucial role in eventually bringing about his banishment from Bağdād (590/1193). The sharpness of the cleavage between these two wings of the school is expressed rather graphically in a treatise written against Ibn al-Ġawzī (and particularly against views expressed in Aḥbār) by Abū l-Faḍl al-ʿAlī, a member of the traditionalist wing of the school. In this treatise, al-ʿAlī accuses Ibn al-Ġawzī, in effect, of being a crypto- Muʿtazī and charges that he and his followers had abandoned the doctrines of the Fathers. However, despite the criticisms levelled against him and de-

saw himself as calling them back to the principles on which the school was founded.

Among the later varieties of Ḥanbalism, it was the strand represented by Ibn 'Aqīl that Ibn al-Ġawzī believed to be the most primitive and the truest. No other Ḥanbalī is quoted with approval more often in Aḥbār.

Even those hostile to him acknowledge his influence within the school.

Precisely the period during which Aḥbār was written.

Ibn Rağāb gives his name as Iṣḥāq b. Ahmad b. Muḥammad b. Gānim Abū l-Faḍl al-ʿAlī and reports that he died in 634/1236 (H. Laoust and A. Hartmann read the nisba as al-ʿUṭī, though I have found no evidence in support of this reading in the sources). In addition to the substantial notice devoted to al-ʿAlī in Ibn Rağāb’s Dayl II, 205–211; see also ad-Dahabi, Tārīḫ al-islām fol. 102a; al-Mundirī, Tahsīlā al-Imām, ii, 163; Ibn al-Imām, Sādarāt V, 163. Cf. also Laoust 1959: 120; Hartmann 1975: 192–193, also index (under al-ʿUṭī). The author of numerous polemical tracts (rasāʿīl katīra), he was known to his contemporaries as a staunch traditionalist and an outspoken critic of tendencies he regarded as deviating from the strict interpretation of Ḥanbalism.

Preserved in Ibn Rağāb’s Dayl II, 205–211. It is clear, however, that the text preserved by Ibn Rağāb represents only part of a longer work. On the basis of references in the portions cited by Ibn Rağāb it is possible to conclude that al-ʿAlī’s Risāla was written late in Ibn al-Ġawzī’s career but sometime prior to his banishment to Wāṣit in 590/1193. It seems most likely that he Risāla was composed sometime between 585/1189 and 590/1193.
spite the precedent set by Ibn ʿĀqīl in the preceding century, there is no evidence that Ibn al-Ḡawzī ever recanted the views advocated in Ḥbār. From all that I can tell, Ḥbār stands as Ibn al-Ḡawzī’s final word on the problem of anthropomorphism and the related issue of ta’wil.

REFERENCES

A. Primary sources

Abū Yaʿlā, Muṭṭamad = Muhammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. al-Farrāʾ, al-Muṭṭamad fi usūl ad-dīn. Ed. and intr. by W. Haddād.

38 Who was forced to recant views similar to those championed by Ibn al-Ḡawzī.

B. Secondary sources